World of Education/World of Education.iso/world_a/afr_july.zip/AFNEWS27.ZIP/NEWS0709.93

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        USENET INTER PRESS NETWORK NEWS

        UPDATED TWICE WEEKLY: TUESDAYS AND FRIDAYS

        LAST UPDATE: 7-9-93 AT 8:30 A.M.


Article: 16913 of soc.culture.african
Newsgroups: soc.culture.african
From: [e-mail]
Subject: ETHIOPIA: Destruction & Construction

                   7/93
           E T H I O P I A       (13)

BUILDING AND DESTROYING

    Ethiopia of Barry Gossa celebrated its first anniversary.  The
first issue brought the TIM meetings which was later referred and
discussed as "MIT scholarship", and condemned in TPLF ranks.
Second issue discussed the TPLF's preparation for war, the third - a
talk on renewed negotiations, the fourth - the rising hate against the
TPLF, the fifth - the victory of the TPLF, the sixth - Eritrean relations
with Israel and TPLF's financial maneuvers, the seventh - Sudan's
(Turabi's) increased role in Ethiopia, the eighth - the University
students massacre, the ninth - mass arrests and Tamrat's official return
to Iran, the tenth - the Paris conference and Israel's role in Ethiopia,
the eleventh - about Eritrea as a neighbor and the return of
the OLF to guerilla, and the twelfth - about the Chat Mafia.

    This issue brings TPLF's economic dedication solely toTigray.
The role of the Chat Mafia is viewed by the TPLF politicians as a
strategic concept to strengthen Tigray which will be the back bone of
the TPLF army, hence its political subsistence.  Huge and unparalleled
development program is in progress in Tigray through the Tigray
Development Association which works closely with severalTigray and
governmental bureaus.  The Association just completed a workshop in
Mekele which cost some 20,000 Birr and lasted few days.  High TPLF
officials were present.  The workshop evaluated strategies and
assigned financial budget for various Tigray offices.  Some of the
budget allocation of the money which originates partly from the Chat
Mafia and partly from the national budget including international
donations, fundings, and borrowers is as follows.  TheTigray Bureau
of Education gets a large amount of the budget, in excess of 3.3
Million Birr, to build elementary schools and equip secondary
schools.  This does not include a separate 500,000 Birr to build
Libraries ordered by Meles himself.  The Tigray Bureau of
Agriculture is another large receiver with most of the funding from the
national budget.  Only recently 277,000 Birr was channeled for
Agricultural training, another 500,000 to build eight Agricultural
centers, and about 100,000 Birr for bee production.  There are five
clinics in construction for 1 million Birr, and about 400,000 Birr from
the World Bank is assigned for construction training of 250 Tigreans
in Mekele.   The construction office took 1.3 Million Birr to build 22
km road from Sinkata to Hawzien and additional 200,000 to build ten
small dams.

    Tigray's development program proceeds while there is no such
program else where - indeed while keeping the other parts of Ethiopia
under war, which is not noticed in other parts of the country for lack
of information deliberately suppressed.  Most of the money is
channeled through numerous arbitrary national and international
programs.  There is a plan to channel millions of dollars of
international donations to Tigray under a geological project that will
dig nine sites allegedly with gold deposits.  The assigned money will
then be used to build infrastructures such as roads and bridges to
remote lands supposedly with the mentioned gold deposits.

    The Chat Mafia is increasing its control over export of
agricultural products, and the possession of EAL is almost complete.
Even minor opposition to the Mafia is eliminated right at the start.  In
fact Abdulizak, theTPLF installed chairman of the Chat corporation
mentioned in Eth. 12 was imprisoned in mid June for challenging the
Mafia's decision to send large amounts of money to support a
children's center in Adua, and based on reports reaching Eth, his ally,
Ibrahim Malka, will be imprisoned soon, unless circumstances force
the TPLF to alter its decision.

    The Constitution Conference held in Addis brought some
recognition to the EPRDF.  The two critically debated issues were
private property versus the role of regional autonomy, and self-
determination of nations.  "The dilemma of this country", a
british diplomat commented, "is that both TPLF and OLF agree on
these fundamental issues".  The OLF did not take part in the
Conference, but few scholars associated with the OLF were
present.  The Amharas in the conference opposed both the
TPLF's concept and the OLF's notion of private property and
self-determination.  "I do not think this people want to build
a united opposition" a frustrated OLF leader commented.


    After the Conference, satisfied by the outcome which
occupied most of Meles time, Meles met his military officials to
prepare a strong offensive in the north and the east, particularly to a
strong hold of the OLF in Ballie.  The military tactic prepared by a
sub-committee in the defense minister had two parts:  a) pressure on
the civilians, and b) military attack on the front.  The pressure on the
civilians included arresting suspected opposition supporters and
torturing known sympathizers.  The military offensive includes
launching heavy and concentrated attack on OLF regions with another
wing dispatched to the north to keep an eye on Kefagn.  The OLF
reported that it eliminated some 700 TPLF army, capturing 78 of
them, with trucks and several armaments.  Karsa, near Dire Dawa,
was reported to be a center of fierce fighting in early June.  A bridge
was also damaged in the west near Didessa.

    Beside the economic imbalance the TPLF is creating, a
subsection in its military is also engaged full time in instigating
conflicts among various ethnic groups.  Human rights groups
observed that this will be a serious problem of the near future.  "The
TPLF sees its existence in the diminishing power of the opposition
which is furnished by inciting war and hate among neighboring
ethnics", an Adere scholar commented.  Harar, Borana, Sidamo, and
Negele areas are suffering the intrigues.


Published and distributed by Barry Gossa of Cairo.










From uwvax!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!wupost!csus.edu!netcom.com!makobili Fri Jul  9 08:34:49 CDT 1993
Article: 16935 of soc.culture.african
Newsgroups: soc.culture.african
Path: uwvax!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!wupost!csus.edu!netcom.com!makobili
From: [e-mail]
Subject: ETHIOPIA: Amnesty International Report
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Sun, 4 Jul 1993 19:31:00 GMT
Lines: 266


AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1993


ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA (p.127-130)

Almost 20,000 suspected supporters of the 0romo Liberation
Front (OLF) and dozens of other government opponents were
detained in Ethiopia. Some 2,000 senior members of former
President Mengistu Haile-Mariam's government and armed forces
arrested in mid-1991 remained in detention without charge or
trial, accused of human rights violations and other offences.
There were reports of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners
and of extrajudicial executions by government forces. Armed
opposition groups, including the OLF, were also reported to
have carried out deliberate and arbitrary killings. In
Eritrea, 900 former officers of the Ethiopian armed forces who
had been captured in May 1991 were handed over to the
Ethiopian authorities and detained. Over 200 Eritreans accused
of human rights violations or criminal offences under the
previous Ethiopian government remained in detention in Eritrea
without charge or trial, and some opponents of the new
Eritrean government were reportedly detained.

The former state of Ethiopia continued to be administered by
two separate provisional governments, one in Ethiopia and one
in Eritrea. Both were scheduled to hold offlce for a two-year
transitional period following the overthrow of former
President Mengistu's government in May 1991.

The Transitional Government of Ethiopia under President Meles
Zenawi was headed by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF). The leading member of the EPRDF, the
Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), formed the new
government security forces from its former guerrilla force.
The EPRDF and its allied political groups in the Council
of Representatives (parliament) were opposed by other
political groups, which were also mostly ethnic-based. Some of
these groups had their own armed forces which clashed with the
government's forces sporadically throughout the year, notably
the OLF.

Elections for 14 new regional assemblies in Ethiopia were held
in June. International observers criticized electoral
irregularities and arrests of government opponents in some
regions. Four political parties, including the OLF, boycotted
the elections, which in two regions were postponed until later
in the year because of fighting and general insecurity. There
were widespread arrests during the regional elections
campaign, particularly of OLF members. Hundreds of OLF
supporters, many of them unarmed activists, were reportedly
detained and scores of others were allegedly killed by
government or pro-government forces. OLF armed units were also
reportedly responsible for deliberate killings of civilians.
Immediately after the elections, the OLF withdrew from the
government coalition and most of its leaders went into
self-imposed exile. OLF armed units, which had clashed
sporadically with government troops earlier in the year,
opposed government forces in some rural Oromo-populated areas
which the OLF claimed to control. Government forces
detained almost 20,000 OLF personnel but continued talks with
the OLF, which prevented any major escalation of the conflict.
A high level of insecurity in the south and east disrupted
relief operations for victims of drought and famine, as well
as for hundreds of thousands of refugees from civil wars and
famine in Somalia and Sudan.

The Provisional Government of Eritrea began preparations for a
1993 referendum on independence with United Nations and other
international observers. The Central Committee of the Eritrean
People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which formed the provisional
government and was the only permitted political party, assumed
legislative powers. Some armed clashes were reported early in
the year in western border areas between EPLF forces and an
opposition Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council
(ELF-RC) force.

In Ethiopia, thousands of government opponents were arrested
and held outside any legal framework. These new detainees, as
well as others arrested in 1991, were held without charge or
trial and without any safeguards for their basic rights.

A Special Prosecutor's Offlce was established in August to
investigate and institute criminal proceedings against people
accused of abusing their positions in the former government or
ruling Workers' Party of Ethiopia. The right to habeas corpus,
which was already ineffective, was formally suspended for six
months from August onwards, and no limit was set on the time
detainees could be held without charge. The Vice-Minister of
Justice was appointed Special Prosecutor. No detainees had
been charged by the end of the year.

After the regional assembly elections in June, the EPRDF
security forces detained almost 20,000 suspected OLF armed
personnel. It did not disclose their identities but some,
including women and children, were believed to be unarmed
civilians. They were held in three military camps at Dedessa
near Gimbi, Blatta in Sidamo region, and Hurso in Hararghe
region. The government said it had detained them in order to
disarm and "re-educate" them politically, but few had been
released by the end of the year. Arrests of OLF political
activists were reported throughout the year, but none was
charged or tried.

Between February and May, 11 former army officers and
civilians were arrested in the capital, Addis Ababa. The
authorities said that they had plotted armed insurrection. Two
of them publicly admitted this, possibly under duress, but all
11 reportedly remained in detention without charge or trial at
the end of the year.

Kaafi Yusuf Ali, a prominent member of the Ogaden National
Liberation Front (ONLF), which had called for a referendum on
independence for Ethiopia's southeastern Ogaden area, was
arrested in Kebre Dahar in eastern Ethiopia in January. He
died in detention in July, reportedly as a result of beatings
and ill-treatment. Several other ONLF supporters were believed
to be in custody at the end of the year.

In June over 20 suspected members of the opposition Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) were arrested in Gedaref
in eastern Sudan, where most had lived for several years as
refugees. They were immediately forcibly returned to Ethiopia.
Tadelle Demeke, who was visiting Sudan for academic research
while a refugee in the United Kingdom, denied that she was an
EPRP member and was released six weeks later. Most of the
others were released shortly afterwards, but four EPRP members
remained in detention without charge or trial at the end of
the year. Four EPRP leaders including Tsegay Gebre-Medhin, who
were detained in August 1991 when EPRP armed opposition
collapsed, remained in detention throughout 1992.

Some 2,000 offlcials of the former government, armed forces
and ruling party in Ethiopia remained in detention
throughout the year without charge or trial. They had been
arrested in 1991 and accused of human rights violations, war
crimes or abuse of power (see Amnesty International Report
1992). They were mostly detained in Sendafa Police College and
Holeta military academy near Addis Ababa, and Tolay military
camp in Wollega region. They were allowed to receive visits
from relatives. In August the final 900 former Ethiopian armed
forces officers who had been captured in Eritrea in May 1991
were handed over to the Ethiopian Government and joined the
others who had been detained.

It appeared that a number of opponents of the EPRDF or TPLF
who had been detained by them before May 1991 were still held
throughout 1992, although there was no offlcial confirmation
of this. They included Hagos Atsbeha, brother of a prominent
defector from the TPLF, who had been abducted from Sudan in
1988 by the TPLF and detained in TPLF-held territory in
Ethiopia. Brigadier-General Beretta Germamew and Colonel
Getahun Wolde-Ghiorgis, who were captured in 1989 by the TPLF
and later fought with it against the government, were
allegedly kept in secret detention from May 1991 onwards
for opposing the new EPRDF government.

In January three leaders of the National Democratic Union
(NDU) who had been arrested in Addis Ababa in November 1991
(see Amnesty International Report 1992) were released without
charge.

There were reports of torture and ill-treatment of some
prisoners, in particular OLF members.

Many areas were affected by political violence and government
soldiers reportedly extrajudicially executed scores of unarmed
civilians. In the east, EPRDF soldiers shot dead two leading
ONLF members in January: Mohamed Sheikh Mohamoud Iraad, a
member of the ONLF central committee, in Dega Bur; and
Abdirashid Sulub Anshur, editor of an ONLF magazine, in Kebre
Dahar. In the regional elections campaign, some people were
reportedly killed for supporting the OLF. In Watar, a town
near Dire Dawa, EPRDF troops shot dead scores of OLF
supporters in March during a demonstration. In April OLF
troops killed over 150 OLF opponents in Bedeno town near Dire
Dawa; their bodies were later recovered from a ravine. Ethnic
and religious tensions led to intercommunal killings as well
as killings of members of ethnic minorities in some areas. In
Harar and Dire Dawa in the east, dozens of members of the
Amhara minority were killed in early 1992, allegedly by OLF
supporters. In Arba Gugu village in Arsi region, armed
militias of the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO),
part of the coalition government, allegedly killed scores of
Amhara civilians in June.

Inquiries into some of these killings were carried out by the
Council of Representatives. Its inquiry into the killings in
Watar called for clearer guidelines on the use of lethal force
by EPRDF soldiers, noting though that they had faced violence
from anti-government demonstrators. The Council's inquiry into
the killings in Bedeno urged the OLF to punish its members who
were responsible, but no such action was known to have been
taken by the OLF.

Groups opposed to the government coalition were also
responsible for human rights abuses, including torture and
deliberate killings of scores of unarmed civilians. In an OLF
camp in the east, several opponents were reportedly tortured
or killed in early 1992. OLF armed units were also alleged to
have deliberately killed unarmed members of ethnic minorities
in predominantly Oromo areas. Three other opposition groups,
including the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia
(IFLO), also reportedly committed deliberate and arbitrary
killings of suspected opponents.

The bodies of thousands of people who "disappeared" or were
extrajudicially executed under the Mengistu government were
discovered and exhumed for proper burial. They included
several detained former officials summarily executed in
November 1974; former Emperor Haile Selassie, killed in
custody in his palace in 1975; Patriarch Tewoflos, former head
of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the Reverend Gudina Tumsa,
former head of the Ethiopian Evangelical Mekane Yesus Church,
and Kassa Wolde-Mariam, a former university president and
government minister, all of whom "disappeared" from detention
in 1979; and thousands of students, workers and farmers who
were extrajudicially executed during the "Red Terror" campaign
in the late 1970s (see Amnesty International Report 1978).

In Eritrea, over 200 people, including opponents of the
provisional Eritrean government, were detained without charge
or trial, and without reference to the law. Information about
them was particularly difficult to obtain, as the authorities
disclosed no details. Many of the detainees had been arrested
in mid-l99l because they were alleged to have violated human
rights or committed criminal offences as employees or
supporters of the former Mengistu government. Ali Higo
Mohamed, a former regional governor, remained in detention
after having been abducted from Addis Ababa in May 1991,
although the government denied holding him. Other detainees
were also believed to be held in secret, such as Tekle-Berhan
Gebre-Tsadik and Wolde-Mariam Bahibi, officials of the armed
opposition ELF-RC, who were alleged to have been abducted from
Kassala in eastern Sudan in April 1992, forcibly returned to
Eritrea and secretly detained there. In October the government
announced the release of 90 detainees, but disclosed no
details about them or the reasons for their imprisonment.

Secret burial grounds of execution victims were also
discovered in Asmara and other places in Eritrea, where
thousands of Eritreans suspected of supporting the EPLF'S
armed struggle for Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia had
been extrajudicially executed during the previous two decades
or more.

There were no reports of any death sentences passed by courts
or judicial executions during 1992 in either Ethiopia or
Eritrea.

Amnesty International continued to appeal to the Ethiopian
authorities to end the arbitrary detention of officials of the
previous government and opponents of the present government,
and to ensure that they were formally charged with
recognizably criminal offences and given fair and prompt
trials within a reasonable time, or released. It called for
independent inquiries into reports of torture and
extra-judicial executions and for steps to be taken to prevent
extrajudicial executions. The organization criticized human
rights abuses by the OLF and other opposition groups.

Amnesty International also appealed to the Eritrean
authorities to ensure that detainees held for offences under
the former Ethiopian government or for their opposition to the
EPLF received fair and prompt trials or were released.



From uwvax!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!decwrl!access.usask.ca!edison.usask.ca!f54oguocha Fri Jul  9 08:35:11 CDT 1993
Article: 16937 of soc.culture.african
Path: uwvax!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!decwrl!access.usask.ca!edison.usask.ca!f54oguocha
From: [e-mail]
Newsgroups: soc.culture.african
Subject: SOCCER NEWS: MALAWIAN SUPER LEAGUE RESULTS + OTHER NEWS
Date: 4 JUL 93 20:32:53 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 69
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
NNTP-Posting-Host: edison.usask.ca

Description: Malawian National Super League
-------------------------------------------

               How They Stand (June 19-25, 1993)
               ---------------------------------

Team                    P    W    D    L    GF    GA    Pts
----                    -----------------------------------
Admarc Tigers           8    4    2    2    10    10     10
MDC United              7    3    3    1    12     9      9
Silver Strikers         5    4    -    1     7     3      8
Limbe Leaf Wanderers    7    3    1    3    18    10      7
Sucoma                  7    3    1    3    13    11      7
Hardware Stars          5    3    1    1    10     6      7
CIVO                    5    2    2    1     4     4      6
Spearhead               7    2    2    3     4     6      6
Red Lions               6    2    1    3     5     9      5
Railway United          5    1    2    2     7     7      4
Work Movers             6    1    1    4     5    18      3
Bata Bullets            3    1    1    1     4     4      3
Blue Eagles             4    1    1    2     4     4      3
Lilongwe Escom          3    -    1    2     1     3      1
------------------------------------------------------------

Comment: Win(W) = 2pts; Draw(D) = 1; GF is used to rank teams
     with equal points.

Corrigenda: In the first posting, it was stated that 12 teams
        are participating in the league. Well, I've since
        been reliably informed that Railways United, which
        initially pulled out because of financial problems,
        later got some help. Also, Sucoma is back to full
        business.


League Results:
--------------

Some of the week-end(June 19-25) results, as reported by the Malawi
News, are:

Bata Bullets          1   Admarc Tigers 2 (Venue = BAT ground, Blantyre)
Limbe Leaf Wanderers  3   Sucoma        4 (Venue = Nchalo)
Limbe Leaf Wanderers  3   MDC United    1
Bata Bullets          2   Sucoma        1
Admarc Tigers         3   Red Lions     1


Next International Matches
--------------------------

1.  Mali Vs Malawi  July 11, 1993; Venue = Bamako.
    (First Leg Score Malawi 1  Mali 1)

2.  Malawi Vs Morocco July 25, 1993; Venue = Kamuzu Stadium, Blantyre.
    (First Leg score: Morocco 0  Malawi 1)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Cheers for now!

oguocha.

Source:  Malawi News(June 19-25, 1993),
     published by Blantyre Newspapers Ltd, P.M.B. 39,
     Blantyre, Malawi. Tel: 671 566, Fax: 671 114, Telex: 44112.

Special Thanks to: Mr. Gideon Phiri for his continued support and supply
           of the newspaper.


From uwvax!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!decwrl!access.usask.ca!edison.usask.ca!f54oguocha Fri Jul  9 08:38:02 CDT 1993
Article: 16955 of soc.culture.african
Path: uwvax!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!decwrl!access.usask.ca!edison.usask.ca!f54oguocha
From: [e-mail]
Newsgroups: soc.culture.african
Subject: AFRICAN SOCCER: WC '94 - ALL WEEKEND RESULTS
Date: 5 JUL 93 17:04:13 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
Lines: 62
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
NNTP-Posting-Host: edison.usask.ca




Description: World Cup Qualifiers' Results


Results of AFRICAN and ASIAN matches played on 03 & 04 July :


African Group A
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

    Nigeria    4-1   Algeria

        P W D L  F  A Pts  Maxpts
Cote d'Ivoire   2 1 1 0  3  2  3     7
Nigeria         2 1 0 1  5  3  2     6
Algeria         2 0 1 1  2  5  1     5


African Group B
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

    Zambia    2-1   Morocco

        P W D L  F  A Pts  Maxpts
Zambia          1 1 0 0  2  1  2     8
Morocco         2 1 0 1  2  2  2     6
Senegal         1 0 0 1  0  1  0     6


African Group C
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

    Zimbabwe   1-0   Cameroon

        P W D L  F  A Pts  Maxpts
Guinea          2 1 0 1  4  3  2     6
Cameroon        2 1 0 1  3  2  2     6
Zimbabwe        2 1 0 1  1  3  2     6


    Halfway through the African second round and the only team that
    can get eliminated in two weeks time is Algeria (when they meet
    Cote d'Ivoire).

Upcoming fixtures
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
18 Jul
======
Africa A        Cote d'Ivoire - Algeria
Africa B        Senegal - Morocco
Africa C        Guinea - Cameroon

Cheers,

Oguocha.

Source:
Harinderpal Singh Grewal            [e-mail]
National Computer Board, Singapore  [e-mail]



From uwvax!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!decwrl!csus.edu!netcom.com!makobili Fri Jul  9 08:38:10 CDT 1993
Article: 16956 of soc.culture.african
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Path: uwvax!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!decwrl!csus.edu!netcom.com!makobili
From: [e-mail]
Subject: ETHIOPIA: "What do the Oromos want?"
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Mon, 5 Jul 1993 17:14:35 GMT
Lines: 216

               WHAT DO THE OROMOS WANT?
                   (A private view)
                  By Bulcha Demekssa

     This is a frequently asked question.  To be scientific and politically
meaningful, the question should be "what do the majority of the Oromo people
want," since more than 25 million people cannot speak all in one voice however
desirable that may be.  Moreover, it is a loaded question because normally the
question does not arise about a people in that form.  But Oromo desire and
demand is not complicated.  It is not as complicated as the question implies.
Like all subjugated people, Oromos want to be free.
     The Oromo people want to be free from the 'Neftengnas' (Neftegna's are
armed militia from the north who are there to "to maintain security', which
really means the suppression of the possible Oromo uprising against
subjugation.)  Next to food and shelter, the most important desideratum of the
Oromo people today is freedom from the menacing presence of non-Oromo armed
men.  That was why succeeding generations of Oromo leaders fought and rebelled
but were systematically silenced.  That is why Oromo youths men and women
struggle today.  That is why Oromo youths will continue the struggle tomorrow.
This cycle will continue until the Oromos are able to take complete control of
their political life as the TPLF does in Tigray.  If and when Oromia is no more
occupied by 'Neftegnas', Oromos would be ready to negotiate with other peoples
of Ethiopia the modality of coexistence, such as a federal arrangement.  Oromo
leaders and peoples have never rejected to live along the rest of the peoples
of Ethiopia as equals, as nobody's subjects, foot soldiers or sharecroppers.
The Oromos have in their culture the art of negotiation called 'Ilaf Ilame' and
understand the benefits of give and take and the tactical value of compromise.
Oromos understand that if the majority of the peoples of Ethiopia agree to live
under federal structure, arrangements have to be worked out in such a way that
sovereignty is shared between the federal government and state or regional
governments.
     Oromos also understand that, despite their bitter history of struggle with
the Central Government of Ethiopia, they would agree to live under a non-Oromo
president within the context of a federation with the constitutional guarantee
that the system will be democratic enough that a qualified Southerner including
an Oromo could be elected president of the federal republic of Ethiopia.  Such
a statement would have been superfluous under normal circumstances, but it
should be understood within the context of Ethiopia where a Southerner, like a
native Liberian in Liberia or a Black or a Jew in America never had the
opportunity to be a president.
     But it is a totally different situation when non-Oromo militia or soldiers
dominate Oromia fully armed as if they were colonial army.  It is also a
different situation to have a federal force stationed in a region or state to
watch over federal facilities or a strategic spot in a border area.  Such a
unit has to consist of soldiers from all ethnic or nationality groups many of
whom speak the language of the locality.
     It is often said that armed militia now deployed in Oromia are there
temporarily during the transitional period.  There is a serious problem with
that.  The regional election in June last year was so badly flawed that
opposition parties actually withdrew from elections.  During the transitional
period, there will be an election of a Constituent Assembly which will
hopefully legislate Ethiopia's first modern constitution. As in the case of the
regional elections, the presence of armed militia will intimidate both the
electorate and opposition candidates.  What guarantee is there that the armed
militia will not repeat what they did during the regional elections?
     An opposition party works in a hostile environment in Ethiopia more than
all the African countries that have accepted and practiced multi-party
democracy.  In other African countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, Cote D'ivoir,
Niger, Ghana, Kenya, Gambia, Botswana, Sechelles, Swaziland, Nigeria, Benin,
Tunisia, Morocco Senegal Mali, Congo, etc., opposition parties could go out to
the voters and campaign in accordance with their respective electoral laws,
without fear that central government  security personnel could follow them and
endanger their lives or freedom.
     Such laws allow opposition parties to present their alternative programs
to the people and point out the weakness of the program of the government and
also expose the unsuitability of individual politicians provided such
information is supported by evidence, the limit in this case being morality and
human decency.  The fact that the electorate observes and makes its own
conclusion is a strong motive for  politicians to behave decently without going
against propriety for which Ethiopians are well known.  In other words, the
voter is the final arbiter.
     One of the answers to the question "what do the Oromos want?" is this
question:  Are they free to compete on a free political forum, or are they
condemned to engaging in armed struggle to free their people?"  And if they are
forced to carry out armed struggle to free their people, is it not ridiculous
to talk about secession, because when you free your people through loss of life
you free them to the ultimate, you do not free half way only to slide back to
subjugation.  Take the situation today: Can the OLF, for example, freely
campaign and explain its program to the Oromo people without having its own
armed guards to protect its candidates from physical danger?
     To illustrate what is meant here, let us ask a question: Why was it that
Fitawurari Mekonen Dori was harassed when he went to his own region to meet
with his own people?  Why doesn't the TGE leave politicians who are not
seditious alone to link up with their people?  If it is the normal concern that
opposition politicians would take away votes, why doesn't the government let
people decide and, if the opposition wins in a particular district or region,
the TGE can negotiate a coalition since isolated victories do not assure anyone
of victory at the national level?  Oromo leadership wants this kind of
democratic regime.  Is that too much to ask?
     It is repeated ad nauseam that Oromos are divided on many important
issues.  The allegation overemphasizes their division and conceals the many
fundamental issues over which they agree.  For example, not two Oromos disagree
on the imperative that there must be an autonomous Oromia.  Again, no two
Oromos would disagree that Oromiffa (the language of the Oromos) should be the
language of the government of Oromia.  This means that it should be the
language of education, courts, extension workers, health program workers, the
language of the bureaucracy, and the language with which the government of
Oromia writes to the Federal Government.  Incidentally, Oromos all over Oromia
understand each other's Oromiffa and communicate freely with each other, local
idioms and accent excepted.
     There is agreement among Oromos that Oromia should be a secular state
under which religion and state would be strictly separated.  Oromo Moslems are
not fundamentalists.  Oromo Christians are not theocratic.  Oromos are not
hateful and therefore not vindictive.  Those who try to portray a different
image of the Oromo people only prolong the conflict and agony of our society.
Those who say that Oromos want to drive out non-Oromos from their region, may
inadvertently, push the country to precipice of war.  Oromos want only to be
free and be masters of their destiny.
     If federalism becomes part of the New Constitution, the Oromos know and
accept that the country would be a federal republic wherein sovereignty is
shared between the federal government on the one hand and state or regional
governments on the other.  Within this framework, the citizens of Ethiopia can
live and work wherever they find the opportunity.  However, that does not
change the fact that a state is, for example, an Afar state or an Oromo state,
and so on, because the people of that state or region are of that particular
ethnic group and the language of the state is the language of the inhabitants
of that region.
     Oromos and other southern peoples have a lot in common.  All southern
peoples who came under the domination of Menelik at the end of the last century
have a common experience, all having been subjugated by 'Neftegnas' and having
been treated as less than second class citizens.  The Oromos therefore want to
forge closer, fraternal and genuine relationships with the other peoples of the
South.  Many Oromos speak the languages of many of the Southern peoples, such
as Kambata, Gurage, Wolaita, Kafa, Somali, Afar, Adare, etc.  Intermarriage
among the Southern peoples is extensive and continuous.
     Oromos also want peace because they have not had peace in a long time.  In
the 60's Bale was routinely bombed because General Wako of Bale led a rebellion
against the repression of his people; against ruthless governors who treated
the Oromo people like their property.  He saw Oromo Moslems being forced to
build Christian Churches.  Although he knew that he was rebelling against the
formidable force of Emperor Haile Sellasie, Wako knew that he was starting a
struggle that could continue for generations to come, and the rebellion did
continue.
     The Oromos want peace because it has always been Oromo sons who were sent
to the firing line.  How many Oromo youths perished in the Eritrean war?  Who
knows?  We can only imagine the number when we listen to practically one out of
every four parents who have lost their sons in the Eritrean war.  Oromo
soldiers were always the most numerous in a regiment.  During the Ethio-Somali
war in 1977, thousands of Oromo youth fell, most likely more than anybody else
because of their large number in the army.
     But the Oromos have made an informal pact among themselves, and that is
that for the sake of peace and sweet life they would not accept the supremacy
of any ethnic group any further.  They do not blame their leaders for being too
radical - on the contrary, they push their leaders such as the OLF to intensify
the struggle to free the Oromo people.  For them, the struggle could take the
form of political fight or even armed struggle.  Oromos are aware that many in
Ethiopia think that Oromos are not ready to fight for anything.  Nothing can be
further from the truth and nobody should act on the assumption that Oromos
would not fight.  There is an Oromo adage which says, "even a dog retaliates if
you step on it."
     Oromos want all the Oromo zones to be within one region known as Oromia.
Oromos know that this has already happened and their otherwise jubilant
sentiment is constrained by the fact that armed men from other regions are in
their midst for reasons that we do not really know now. Moreover, Oromos also
know that there are sinister forces at work to halt the march of history by
dividing up the Oromo nation into 'provinces.'  We are assured by the TGE that
this will not happen and surely Oromos will not accept it.  Oromos wish to be
assured by the TGE, as well, that non-Oromo armed men will soon leave Oromia
unless it is within the framework of a national army which has to be deployed
wherever it is needed.
     Finally, any serious analyst of the Ethiopian situation knows that unless
the major nationalities or ethnic groups agree on a formula of power sharing,
there cannot be peace in Ethiopia.  Who represents these major groups?  In the
case of the Oromos for example, the major Oromo groups such as OLF, IFLO, and
OPDO can represent most Oromos.  In case of the Amhara people, certainly AAPO
cannot be ignored without risking terrible instability.  Naturally, EPDM, which
is already a major actor on the Ethiopian political stage, has to represent
those Amharas who follow it.  In the case of Tigray, there is no problem
because TPLF apparently represents all of Tigray.  There are other major
liberation movements which must be included.  But to speak of small groups as
nationalities or even ethnic groups is to find excuse to make the country look
ungovernable.
     What is required is to ensure that minority groups and individuals
exercise their human rights including the right to participate in the political
life of the nations; but to try to recognize every small ethnic group as a
region or a self-governing territory would be a political impossibility.  Those
who speak of some 80 linguistic groups should not use this fact to delay the
emancipation of the larger and more viable nationalities.
     In addition, there are groups which consider themselves as political
parties and claim a large following.  This has never been tested because they
are in exile.  One wonders why these groups do not take risk and enter Ethiopia
to organize political parties.  (In any case politics is never without some
kind of risk.)  One is not necessarily referring to individual politicians but
political organizations.
     It is often said that existing political parties, particularly those
overseas, belong to this or that ethnic group, and if their ethnic group is
part of the power structure, their political party should find its rightful
place in that ethnic structure.  When everything is said and done, the most
important consideration (or the bottom line as the Americans say), is that
Afars, Amharas, Gurages, Oromos, Somalis, Tigreans, etc. (ordered
alphabetically) must agree to live together if peace and stability is to reign
in Ethiopia.  It is too short term a view to think that democracy can take root
in a country when the major nationalities are profoundly malcontent.  And the
solution is so obvious:  it is to democratically share power.  If the highest
stake is the presidency, all major political forces could agree to support a
candidate rather than each presenting its own.  A compromise must be struck for
the sake of peace.
     The price of peace is not cheap.  There could be other solutions or a
combination of solutions.  What is most urgently required is to turn the
country away from the precipitous direction which it is facing now.


*********************************************************************
*    Mr. Bulcha Demeksa has worked as an executive board
*    member of the World Bank representing seventeen
*    African countries.  Currently he is a consultant on African
*    affairs and resides in New York.  He is also a member
*    of the advisory boards of the Ethiopian Review and
     the Ethiopian Examiner magazines."
*    The above article is taken from the Ethiopian Examiner
*    (June 1993) with permission from the Author and from
*    the publisher.
*********************************************************************





From uwvax!uwm.edu!wupost!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!decwrl!access.usask.ca!edison.usask.ca!f54oguocha Fri Jul  9 08:45:35 CDT 1993
Article: 17029 of soc.culture.african
Path: uwvax!uwm.edu!wupost!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!decwrl!access.usask.ca!edison.usask.ca!f54oguocha
From: [e-mail]
Newsgroups: soc.culture.african
Subject: SOCCER NEWS: SOME CONTINENTAL RESULTS + UPDATES
Date: 7 JUL 93 23:44:30 GMT
Organization: University of Saskatchewan
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Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
NNTP-Posting-Host: edison.usask.ca


Description: Some Continental Soccer Results
-------------------------------------------

1. African Cup of Champions - All Available Results
   ------------------------------------------------

Zamalek(Egypt)              1  Kaizer Chiefs(South Africa) 0
Kaizer Chiefs(S.Africa)     2  Zamalek(Egypt)              1
Wydad Athletic(Morocco)     3  Stationery Stores(Nigeria)  1
Stationery Stores(Nigeria)  4  Wydad Athletic(Morocco)     1
Red Devils(Zambia)          0  Sunrise(Mauritius)          0
Sunrise(Mauritius)          1  Red Devils(Zambia)          1

**Result Awaited: Asante Kotoko(Ghana) Vs ??  (2nd leg).
  Who has it?????

    ------------------------------------
    Qualifiers for Quater Final:
    ------------------------------------
        Zamalek(Egypt)
        Stationery Stores(Nigeria)
        Red Devils(Zambia)
    ------------------------------------

    Scorers:
    -------
    Sunrise           - Fidy Rasaonaivo (41st min, penalty)
    Red Devils        - Karl Remy (40th min)
    Stationery Stores - Ezekiel Alamu (36th min), Arthur Moses (45th min)
                Kwesi Bonsue (57th min), Teslim Fatusi (88th min)
    Wydad Athletic    - Fertout Yousef(49th min).
    --------------------------------------------------------------------

2.  Cup Winners Cup
    ---------------

El-Kanemi(Nigeria)          4   Olympic De Mvolye(Cameroon)  0
Olympic De Mvolye(Cameroon) 3   El-Kanemi(Nigeria)           0


3.  CAF Cup
    -------

Hellenic(South Africa)   3      Gor Mahia(Kenya)      1
Gor Mahia(Kenya)         2      Hellenic(S.Africa)    0
El-Harat                 6      Hearts of Oak(Ghana)  5 (on penalties)
Madini                   0      Zimba                 1
Zumunta                  2      Air Mauritania        1
Mbelinga                 0      Petro Sport           0
Canon                    0      ASA                   2
Insurance                7      Young Ones            0

N.B. Bear with me for not supplying the names of the countries of some
     of the teams in this group. Every info will be available next time.

---------------------------------------------------------------------

cheers! More results soonest!!!

oguocha.

Sources: African News Weekly(June 25 $ July 2, 1993)
     Reginald Dlamini(South Africa)



From uwvax!uchinews!att-out!cbfsb!cbnewsg.cb.att.com!kgg Fri Jul  9 08:48:18 CDT 1993
Article: 17054 of soc.culture.african
Newsgroups: soc.culture.african
Path: uwvax!uchinews!att-out!cbfsb!cbnewsg.cb.att.com!kgg
From: [e-mail] (kubrom.g.ghiorgis)
Subject: Eritrean President's Address to the OAU
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Sender: [e-mail]
Organization: AT&T
Distribution: na
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 1993 21:22:45 GMT
Lines: 113

After the formal recognition of Eritrea by the international
community, it became a member of the OAU. Below is the first
address of the Eritrean President to the African leaders gathered
in Cairo for the annual summit.

Thanks.

Kubrom

 Disclaimer - I represent myself.
_________________________________________________________________


        ADDRESS BY H.E. ISSAIAS AFWERKI
               PRESIDENT OF
           THE STATE OF ERITREA

            29th OAU Summit
               Cairo
              June 28, 1993



Mr. Chairman,
Your Excellency President Hosni Mubarak,
Honourable Heads of States and Governments,
Your Excellency Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim,

In the name of distinguished Heads of States and Governments assembled here,
I have the honour and privilege to thank your Excellency and the Egyptian
Government for the warm hospitality and cordiality accorded to us.  It is
fitting for this beautiful and historic city to be the venue for the 29th
OAU summit and its President to be the Chairman of the Organization for the
year ahead.  May I, at this juncture, congratulate, on behalf of my
colleagues, your Excellency for your election as the new Chairman of the
OAU and wish you the best success in your endeavors this year.

Your Excellencies,

The Eritrean people have today achieved the national independence that was
denied to them for a century through a costly liberation struggle and the
due process of law.  In the event, my pleasure to be amongst you today to
reclaim the seat in this august body is boundless.

But this pride and joy does not rest in our mere accession to the OAU.  Nor
does it derive from a symbolic or spiritual gratification that we feel in
rejoining the family from which we have been left out for so long.

As your Excellencies will agree with me, this joy and pride rests in and is
tribute to the resilience of the Eritrean people.  It is a testimony to
their tenacity to endure untold sufferings in Africa's longest war for the
cause of freedom, justice and the respect of basic human rights in the face
of international isolation, including neglect from this very organization.
Yet, although Africa and the OAU had chosen to ignore the ordeal and
repetitive petitions of our people in the past, they can only rejoice in
their current achievement.  Because, in the final analysis, this is and
remains an African achievement.

Although we dare not claim familiarity with the inner workings and
constraints of this organization, we cannot hide - at least on the basis
of our observation from without - our disappointment in its track record.
To mince our words now and applaud the OAU would neither serve the desired
purpose of learning lessons from our past nor reflect positively on our
honesty and integrity.

Indeed, the sad fact remains that the OAU has become a nominal organization
that has failed to deliver on its pronounced objectives and commitments. In
this regard, I must admit that we have sought membership in the organization
not because we have been impressed by its achievements but, as a local
proverb goes, in the spirit of familial obligation; because we are keenly
aware that what is ours is ours.

The critical view that we hold on the performance of the organization has
not been measured by the yard stick of its contribution or failure to act in
seeking a solution to our cause.  Nor is it based on a lack of reasonable
knowledge of the intricacies of the organization.

Indeed, although the OAU has often championed the lofty ideals of unity,
cooperation, economic development, human rights and other worthy objectives,
it has failed to seriously work for their concrete realization.  And thirty
years after the foundation of the organization, our continent remains
afflicted by growing poverty and backwardness.

The African continent is today a marginalized actor in global politics and
the world economic order.  Africa is not a place where its citizens can walk
with raised heads but a continent scorned by all its partners; a continent
that seems to produce endlessly the wrong manuals for economic development,
democracy and political management.

That all these problems are not of our making is of course apparent.  Much
of the blame rests on the legacy of our colonial past and unfair practices
that continue to date.  However, these justifications cannot offer us
consolation or cover up our failures.  We must put our act together if this
continent is to be relieved from the multiple problems that have devoured
it for decades.

The first step in this direction is an honest admission of our past errors
and shortcomings.  This will require a new vision as well as the political
courage to make a sober analysis of why and how we went wrong.

I must stress again, perhaps at the risk of repetition, that we do not find
membership in this organization under the present circumstances spiritually
gratifying or politically challenging.  But whatever the past and however
dim the prospects for the future might be, we shall not shy from praying [?]
and doing our utmost, limited and modest as this is, for the betterment of
the organization.

Finally, I wish to express gratitude to President Mubarak for his hospitality
and express my best wishes to him for success as the new chairman.


Thank you
_________________________________________________________________